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Abstract
Accounts of the recent financial crisis claim that the practice of securitizing bank
loans had led banks to be less vigilant in their lending habits. Securitization, the
argument goes, gives the originators of the loans worse incentives to screen potential
borrowers and monitor them as compared to traditional direct lending. But, unless
investors are pricing securities irrationally, wouldn’t contract theory suggest that banks
should always prefer the contract that allows them to commit to higher vigilance?
This paper addresses this problem by introducing a model in which securitization
leads to laxer lending standards, even though it is chosen optimally by banks and
investors. I construct a model where investment is performed through intermediaries
(banks) that choose the volume of lending and a variable level of effort in screening
potential borrowers, set the lending standards, and can finance their activities either
by eliciting deposits or selling securities. Securitization allows the banks to credibly
communicate to investors information about the borrowers, which depositors cannot
access.
Securitization has two effects: at fixed leverage, securitization gives banks better
incentives to screen borrowers and leads to higher lending standards; however, it also
allows banks to choose a higher level of leverage, which in turn degrades the screening
effort. In equilibrium, securitization leads to lower vigilance, but is still preferred
because it allows the banks to intermediate more funds. Paradoxically, the method of
finance that allows banks to better communicate information about borrowers leads in
equilibrium to less information being produced.
The model also provides a natural explanation for why securitization is not observed
below a strict credit rating cutoff (FICO 620), and why securitization activity can
discontinuously stop as a continuous function of overall economic conditions.
1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, many fingers have been pointed at the growth
of the market for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) as a central source of instability.
∗Department of Economics, Hebrew University, E-mail: assaf.patir@mail.huji.ac.il. I am grateful to
Martin Eichenbaum, and Lawrence Christiano for advice, and to Mirko Wiederholt, Guido Lorenzoni,
Matthias Doepke, Gadi Barlevy, Ralf Meisenzahl, and Stefania Albanesi for discussion and comments.
1
Through these inscrutable investment vehicles, the argument goes, banks have found a
way to disguise risky assets as safe, and to be insufficiently vigilant in monitoring their
borrowers since someone else is bearing most of the risk (e.g. Caprio et al., 2010; Gorton,
2009; Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008; Mian and Sufi, 2009). Empirical evidence that has
emerged since supports the claim that securitization leads to higher default rates, and
suggests that this might be due to lax screening of borrowers (Keys et al., 2009, 2010,
2012; Elul, 2016; Purnanandam, 2011). These observations raise an important question: if
securitization indeed exacerbates agency problems between a bank and its investors, why
would banks prefer this method of finance?
To explicate this question, recall that in a typical principle-agent problem, it would be in
the best interest of the agent to specify a contract that would make it incentive-compatible
for himself to behave as close as possible to the first-best. Thus, if banks behave more
responsibly when they raise funds via traditional deposits, then they should not want to
switch to securitization. Indeed, the whole idea behind securitization (DeMarzo, 2005) is
that it allows the bank to design a more general contract with investors, which should
reduce agency problems, rather than exacerbate them.
In this paper I propose a theory of securitization, in which securitization emerges as
an equilibrium outcome even though it leads to lower vigilance in screening borrowers. I
introduce a model in which banks make loans to households, choosing the volume of loans
they make, the effort they exert in screening households, and whether to finance these
loans through eliciting deposits or selling securities. The difference between securitization
and deposits in the model is that the first allows the bank to communicate information
about borrowers to the buyers of securities, while depositors do not have access to such
information. The key finding is that while securitization allows the bank to commit to a
higher level of effort at fixed leverage, it also leads to a higher equilibrium leverage, which
in turn leads to lower effort. Thus, it is not that securitization transfers risk from the
bank to the investor in a way that disincentives the bank from exerting sufficient effort
directly (in fact, the banks end up taking more risk), but rather it is the indirect effect
of motivating the bank to leverage up that generates the lower effort. Paradoxically, the
method of finance that allows for more transparent information leads to that information
being less valuable.
This conclusion bares relevance for other financial innovations as well, as it points out
how financial technologies that are intended to mitigate frictions, might lead to unintended
consequences through the leverage channel.1 In fact, this model exhibits a number of the
phenomena discussed in Gertler et al. (2016): the financial innovation (securitization)
increases both the credit supplied and the appetite for risk, and a small deterioration in
economic conditions can lead to a large collapse and a financial crisis. Therefore, this
paper can be considered as a possible micro-foundation for the financial sector in Gertler
et al. (2016), since the advantage of the innovation is modeled explicitly here (rather than
1See also Iachan et al. (2015) for a general discussion.
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assumed as an exogenous proficiency advantage).
The model assumes that the bank screens potential borrowers by generating a signal
about the probability that they default. The accuracy of the signal is chosen by the bank
at a cost, and is unobservable to investors. The signal itself – but not its accuracy –
can be reliably communicated to investors when the bank chooses to sell securities. The
idea here is that the signal is composed of objectively verifiable information about which
the bank cannot lie, but which can be obtained with variable accuracy (e.g. value of the
asset, income of the borrower).2 As usual in such models, as the leverage ratio increases,
the bank’s incentive to invest in the signal decreases, so that in equilibrium the level of
investment in the signal is lower than the first-best.
When banks choose to finance by using deposits there is no way to communicate the
value of the signals to the depositors. Thus, in addition to the above asymmetric infor-
mation problem, there is the danger that the bank will find it optimal to make out loans
to borrowers regardless of the value of the signal. While lending to a potential borrower
with a bad signal is socially undesirable, it may be profitable for the bank at high enough
leverage ratios. The result is that financing through deposits leads to both a lower leverage
ratio than securities, and as mentioned previously, this in turn implies that securitization
is characterized by lower lending standards.
Beyond reproducing the observed association between securitization and default rates,
this paper also explains the empirical observation that securitized loans are more likely
to default than non-securitized loans, even after controlling for credit ratings (Keys et al.,
2010, 2012; Purnanandam, 2011). Unlike previous literature, which suggests that this is
due to banks using private information to securitize only lower-quality loans (An et al.,
2009; Downing et al., 2009), in my model this is due to banks screening less accurately
when securitizing. In the consumer credit market, where lending decisions are often made
automatically based on mechanical analysis of information provided by the borrower, the
reader may find this new interpretation more plausible.
Obviously, it is possible that there are other advantages to securitization that lead banks
to use this method of finance even if it leads to lower lending standards. Such advantages
can be circumventing regulation, tax benefits, and others (Gorton and Metrick, 2012).
The existence of other advantages notwithstanding, this paper point out that even without
them, financial innovations that aim to mitigate agency problems might lower investment
quality through an increase in leverage.
An additional advantage of my model is that it leads naturally to abrupt stops in secu-
ritization activity. Formally, the choice between funding through securitization or through
deposits is a matter of determining which of two local maxima is the global maximum,
which is a binary function of continuous parameters of the model. Thus, when, for ex-
ample, the unconditional quality of potential borrowers drops below a critical threshold,
2Mian and Sufi (2017) provide evidence that during the years 2002-2005 there was an increase in income
overstatement, suggesting that the reliability of the information about borrower is a choice variable for
banks or other originators.
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securitization stops, and the overall volume of lending drops discontinuously. This helps
address other puzzles about the MBS market, namely, why originators refrain from securi-
tizing below a certain cutoff of credit scores (Keys et al., 2010), and why this market came
to an abrupt stop in 2007.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives a brief background on securitization
and reviews the relevant literature; the model is presented in section 3, and the solution
is analyzed in section 4; in section 5 I demonstrate how the model leads to sudden stops;
and conclusions are summarized in section 6; appendix A. expands on a technical result.
Finally, in appendix B. I consider the effects of bailouts in an extention of the basic model.
Bailouts are represented as a commitment by the government to guarantee the face value
of securities in some states of the world. The bailout promise relaxes the investors’ partic-
ipation constraint, and therefore gives the bank more flexibility. This, in turn, allows the
bank to leverage up, and, as a result, might further lower the level of screening effort. The
welfare effect of a bailout promise is ambiguous.
2 Background
The market for securities backed by bank loans was created in 1970 and has been growing
rapidly until it collapsed before the financial crises of 2008 (Gorton and Metrick, 2012).3
The emergence of this market has lead researchers to study the advantages that motivate
financial intermediaries to choose securitization,4 and had identified many such advantages.
For example, the financial intermediary might simply wish to normalize cash flows (James,
1988; Cumming, 1987). Alternatively, it might sell its claims on the original assets and
purchase the pool security in order to share risk with similar agents holding similar assets.
Assets of low quality (as well as over-collateralization) may be repackaged to create an in-
strument with a higher credit rating (tranching), attracting investors that would otherwise
refrain from investing in the underlying asset due to risk aversion or regulatory restric-
tions. Additional possible advantages include reducing asset-liability mismatch (Franke
and Krahnen, 2007), circumventing regulatory restrictions, and tax planning (Han et al.,
2015), amongst others (cf. Pennacchi, 1988; Flannery, 1989; Kareken, 1987; Schipper and
Yohn, 2007).
A number of papers propose models to formalize some of the conjectured advantages
of securitization listed above (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987; Benveniste and Berger, 1987;
Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Parlour and Plantin, 2008), all these papers employ some
form of information asymmetry and show how securitization helps overcome the agency
problem. However,these models do not imply that securitization would lead to lower lending
standards; in fact, the increased flexibility in choosing the structure of the SPV allows banks
to commit to higher levels of effort (DeMarzo, 2005; Fender and Mitchell, 2009).
3See Gorton and Souleles (2007) for a review of the institutional details of this market.
4Gorton and Metrick (2012) is a comprehensive review of this literature.
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The main goal of this paper is to explain how securitization leads to lower lending
standards. We therefore focus on the bank’s lending decision and how it is influenced by
the relationship between the bank and the investors. The only aspects of securitization
that are important in the model presented here are the ability to communicate information
about the borrower to investors and the ability to flexibly choose the tranching structure.
The other advantages of securitization are surely important, but do not enter this analysis.
The failure of mortgage-backed-securities in the recent crisis has lead researchers to
reexamine securitization. Empirical studies by Mian and Sufi (2009), Keys et al. (2009),
and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) showed that default rates were higher for securitized loans.
Keys et al. (2009, 2010, 2012) additionally consider default rates as a function of credit
ratings, and find a discontinuity around the value of FICO 620: borrowers whose credit
rating is just above this value default more frequently than those whose rating is just below.
Since loans to individuals with credit ratings below FICO 620 are difficult to securitize,
the authors suggest that banks anticipate that they will have to hold such loans on the
balance sheet, and thus screen such borrowers more carefully. As noted above, the results
of my model explain these observed phenomena. Purnanandam (2011) uses the disruption
to the MBS market in 2007, and also finds higher default rates of securitized mortgage
loans, which is more severe at banks with lower capital, which is again consistent with my
model.
3 The Model
3.1 Overview
The model consists of borrowers, investors, and a bank, and has two time periods t = 0, 1.
Borrowers are passive: they simply request a loan at some constant interest rate, and have
no knowledge about the probability that they will be able to return it. The bank has the
technology to generate a signal in order to estimate this probability. The accuracy of the
signal is chosen by the bank at a cost and is unobservable by others. The bank finances its
lending by either eliciting deposits from or selling securities to risk-neutral investors; the
advantage of securitization is that the bank is able to credibly communicate the value of
the signal to these investors.
3.2 Borrowers and Signal
At time t = 0 there are infinitely many potential borrowers each seeking a loan of size L.
There are two types of borrowers: a fraction (1 + q)/2 are good and will repay W > L at
t = 1, and a fraction (1− q)/2 are bad and will default and repay nothing. We assume that
q ∈ (0, 1) so the majority of potential borrowers are good, but also that (1 + q)W/2 ≤ L,
so lending to a random borrower without knowing his type is not profitable.
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The potential borrowers do not know their own type and cannot learn about it; only the
bank has the technology to learn about the quality of a potential borrower. This structure
is appropriate for the consumer loan market, where creditors are likely better equipped
than borrowers to estimate the probability of a negative turn of events. Furthermore, this
paper focuses on the interaction between the banks and the investors, so the interaction
with borrowers is kept very simple: borrowers passively request loans at constant rate of
return, and the bank is making all the decisions.
The bank can learn about potential borrowers by producing a signal that takes two
values: high and low, denoted S ∈ {SH , SL}. The joint distribution of the signal with the
borrower’s type is
Signal/Borrower type Good Bad
S = SH (1 + q)(1 + α)/4 (1− q)(1− α)/4
S = SL (1 + q)(1− α)/4 (1− q)(1 + α)/4
,
and the parameter α ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of the accuracy of the signal. Notice that at
α = 1 the signal fully reveals the type of the borrower, and at α = 0 the signal carries no
information at all. The bank chooses α at a cost c(α) per borrower screened, where
c(0) > 0, c(1) = +∞, c′(•) > 0, c′′(•) > 0.
The choice of α is unobservable to anyone but the bank.
The parameter α is simply a linear transformation of the covariance between the type
of the borrower and the signal, and since we leave the cost function general, the underlying
assumption is that the bank only gets to choose the correlation between the signal and
the return. Limiting the bank’s choice to a one-parameter family of possible signals is
essential to the results and is also standard in macroeconomics: for example, a similar
situation would result if the signal was distributed normally around the actual return,
and the bank could only choose the variance of the signal. This structural assumption
can be interpreted to mean that the signal is a result of a widely understood method of
screening borrowers, where increasing the effort (e.g. gathering more information about
the borrower) necessarily reduces both the probabilities of a type I and type II errors.
3.3 Investors
There is a large number of investors in the economy, all of whom are are risk-neutral and
have access to a perfect storage technology. Thus, investors generate a perfectly elastic
supply of funds as long as the net expected return is nonnegative. Investors can provide
funds to the bank in two ways: they can either make deposits or buy securities. The
difference between the two methods will be discussed in 3.4.3.
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3.4 The Bank
A single profit-maximizing bank starts out with an exogenous amount of resources X > 0
(this can be thought of as inside equity or bank capital). The bank has a few decisions
to make on both the lending and financing sides. On the lending side, the bank must
decide how many potential borrowers to screen at what accuracy (α), and then set a policy
for lending based on the signal obtained. On the finance side, the bank also chooses how
much funds to raise and whether to do this by eliciting deposits or selling securities. When
eliciting deposits, the bank also chooses the interest rate it offers depositors, and when
securitizing, it chooses the structure of the securities.
3.4.1 Lending Decision
The lending decision of the bank has three components: how many borrowers to screen,
what α ∈ [0, 1] to use, and for each possible value of the signal {SH , SL}, whether or not
to make out a loan.
Notice that it is never profitable for the bank to make out a loan to an individual that
was screened with α > 0 if the signal obtained was S = SL. The reason is that the bank
can always do better by dropping that individual and lending to a new individual who was
not screened at all: lending to the unscreened individual avoids the screening costs, and
the probability of default is strictly lower. Thus, we can limit attention to cases where
the bank chooses to make out loans to nH high-signal individuals who were screened with
accuracy α > 0, and nNS individuals who were not screened at all. In order to find nH
borrowers with a high signal at accuracy α, the expected number of potential borrowers
that must be screened is 2nH/(1 + qα), so the total expected cost of lending is
C(α, nH , nNS) =
2nHc(α)
1 + qα
+ (nH + nNS)L. (1)
The first term is the cost of screening, and the second is the sum lent. It is worth noting
that C(α, nH , nNS) is increasing in α: since
c(α) =
∫ α
0
c′(α˜)dα˜ ≤ αc′(α),
we have
∂αC(α, n) =
2nc(α)
1 + qα
(
c′(α)
c(α)
− q
1 + qα
)
≥ 2nc(α)
(1 + qα)2α
> 0.
In principle one could imagine a more complex setting where the bank is allowed to
screen different borrowers with different accuracies, but one can show that since all bor-
rowers are a-priori identical and due to the convexity properties of the problem, there is
never any reason to do so, so this simplification is without loss of generality.
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3.4.2 A Simplifying Assumption or Mortgage Agents
Equation (1) is slightly at odds with the description of the model as it represents the
expected cost of lending (before the screening is preformed). To avoid the complication of
having to deal with a stochastic decision-rule, I shall assume that (1) is simply the cost.
However, this can easily be modeled by assuming that there are mortgage agents who find
potential borrowers, fill out applications on their behalf, and submit it to the bank. The
bank charges the agents a non-refundable application fee equal to the cost of screening.
This moves all uncertainty about screening to the agents and makes (1) precise.
3.4.3 Financing Decision
The bank raises funds by either eliciting deposits or selling securities. Financing by securi-
tization works as follows: the bank announces the amount of of high- and low-signal loans
it intends to make, and the amount of funds it plans to raise y0 > 0. The bank then pools
the loans together (in an SPV), and promises investors a payoff at t = 1 that depends of
the total revenue from the loans in the pool. For the sake of this paper it is sufficient to
limit attention to the following set of payoff schedules, which is parameterized by the single
variable T :
δ(Y ) =
{
Y Y ≤ T,
T Y > T.
(2)
This defines a two-tranche structure where the bank holds the upper tranche, and is the
one most frequently observed. In Appendix A. we consider a a model where the bank is
allowed to optimally design the contract offered and show that the structure in (2) is a
approximately optimal.5
The critical assumption about securitization is that the bank is able to credibly com-
municate the value of the signal S for each borrower to the investors buying the securities.
The signal should be thought of as composed of hard information like a credit rating, the
location of the borrower, etc., so that the bank would incur some serious penalty if it were
caught falsely reporting. The implication is that when securitizing, the bank’s declaration
of the number of high- and low-signal borrowers is enforceable. However, investors cannot
see the bank’s choice of α.
Deposits are simple debt contracts.6 As with securitization, the bank announces the
how many loans it plans to make, the amount of funds it plans to raise y0, and the interest
5It should be noted that the analysis in this paper can be carried out with the optimal structure, and
that this has no qualitative effect on the results. Splitting the lower tranche into a few tranches is also
inconsequential: it may be desirable to do so if the bank is facing investors with different risk attitudes, but
since the bank’s decisions only depend on its own payoff schedule, this will not play a role in our analysis.
6Deposits in this model are not insured. If deposits were insured, the bank would not need to pay
an interest to the risk-neutral investors, but it would need to pay a premium to the insurer. If one then
assumes that the premium is such that the insurer’s budget is balanced, then the entire analysis remains
invariant.
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rate paid on that sum; however, notice that here the bank has no way of committing
that the loans made will be to high-signal individuals. If we denote the value promised to
depositors at t = 1 by T , the payoff schedule to investors is precisely (2).
The different assumptions about the information structures between securities and de-
posits is motivated by empirical observations: securities always specify to the buyer a short
list of characteristics of the underlying assets. In the case of consumer credit, this infor-
mation typically includes the credit ratings of the borrowers. While it is hard to imagine
a bank providing false information about such characteristics, it is virtually impossible for
investors to know how much effort the bank puts into generating that information. This is
precisely the difference between the value of the signal S and its accuracy α. Depositors, on
the other hand, typically do not have easy access to information about the bank’s assets.
3.5 Large n approximation
When the bank’s lending plan is (α, nH , nNS), the expected revenue in t = 1 is
µ(α, nH , nNS) = E[Y ] =
1 + q
2
[
1 + α
1 + qα
nH + nNS
]
W. (3)
If the borrowers were statistically independent, then the revenue would be distributed
as a sum of two binomial distribution, which for a large number of borrowers can be
approximated by a normal random variable Y ∼N(µ, σ2), where
σ2 =
1− q2
4
[
1− α2
1 + qα2
nH + nNS
]
W 2.
However, we do not wish to make the assumption of statistical independence. Since banks
are using the same algorithm to screen all borrowers, it stands to reason that getting a
high signal on a borrower of a certain type may be correlated with getting a high signal
on another borrower of the same type. Rather than making micro-level assumptions about
the specific structure of the correlations between borrowers, we keep the approximation
Y ∼N(µ, σ2), but modify the variance to
σ2 =
1− q2
4
[
1− α2
(1 + qα)2
n1+ζH + n
1+ζ
NS
]
W 2, ζ ∈ [0, 1]. (4)
The parameter ζ is a reduced form alternative to specifying the exact correlation between
any two borrowers. The value ζ = 0 represents statistical independence, and ζ = 1
represents perfect correlation. Basically, we are assuming that there are some underlying
correlations that make σ2 grow with n at some rate between independence and perfect
correlation, and drop all but the leading order term.
9
4 Analysis
To analyze the equilibrium of this system, it is instructive to consider separately the equi-
libria that would arise in the cases where the bank was forced to use either securities or
deposits. For both cases we denote the bank’s expected share of the revenue at t = 1 by
G(α, nH , nNS;T ), where
G(α, nH , nNS ;T ) = E[Y − δ(Y )] =
∫
∞
T
(Y − T )dΦ
(
Y − µ
σ
)
=
= σφ
(
T − µ
σ
)
+ (µ − T )
[
1− Φ
(
T − µ
σ
)]
. (5)
Note that the dependence on (α, nH , nNS) enters through µ and σ, which were defined
in (3)-(4). The investors’ share is simply µ − G, therefore the investors’ participation
constraint in both cases is
y0 = µ(α, nH , nNS)−G(α, n;T ), (6)
where y0 is the amount that investors transfer the banks at t = 0.
4.1 Securitization
Securitization allows the bank to specify in advance how many high-signal and how many
low-signal borrowers will be included in the pool. Since making out loans to borrowers
with a low signal always reduces the surplus, the bank always prefers to commit to not
making out loans to such borrowers. Thus, the bank’s plan when securitizing is always to
commit to nH high-signal borrowers. The cost of that was calculated in (1) to be
C(α, nH , 0) =
2nHc(α)
1 + qα
+ nHL.
The bank’s eventual choice of α is made after the contract is finalized, so it is determined
by setting the marginal cost of increasing α equal to the marginal revenue, i.e.
2nHc(α)
1 + qα
(
c′(α)
c(α)
− q
1 + qα
)
= ∂αG(α, nH , 0;T ). (7)
The above is the bank’s incentive-comparability constraint. The bank needs to raise y0 =
C(α, nH , 0)−X, which plugged into (6) gives the investors’ participation constraint:
2c(α)
1 + qα
nH + nHL−X = µ(α, nH , 0) −G(α, nH , 0;T ). (8)
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For fixed nH , solving (7)-(8) together determines α(n) and T (n). The optimal n is given
by solving the Lagrangian
L = G(α, nH , 0;T )− λ
[
µ(α, nH , 0) −G(α, nH , 0;T ) − 2c(α)
1 + qα
nH − nHL+X
]
+
+ τ
[
∂αG(α, nH , 0;T )− 2nHc(α)
1 + qα
(
c′(α)
c(α)
− q
1 + qα
)]
.
Substituting the first constraint into the objective function allows us to rewrite the La-
grangian and leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1. In the subgame where the bank is constrained to finance through secu-
ritization, the bank chooses nNS = 0, and α, nH and T are given by the solution to the
lagrangian system:
L = µ(α, nH , 0)− C(α, nH , 0)−
− λ
[
µ(α, nH , 0) −G(α, nH , 0;T ) − 2c(α)
1 + qα
nH − nHL+X
]
+
+ τ
[
∂αG(α, nH , 0;T )− 2nHc(α)
1 + qα
(
c′(α)
c(α)
− q
1 + qα
)]
, (9)
together with the additional requirement that the solution satisfies the positive profits con-
dition
µ(α∗, n∗H , 0)− C(α∗, n∗H , 0) ≥ 0.
The economic interpretation of the above is that the bank is maximizing the total
surplus µ− C, subject to (7) and (8).
4.2 Deposits
When using deposits, the bank announces how many loans n it plans to make out, how
much it plans to raise y0, and what depositors would be paid T . The bank then chooses
α, nH and nNS to maximize expected revenue, subject to nH + nNS = n. The bank’s
eventual choice of α is determined exactly as in securitization by setting the expected
marginal revenue equal to the marginal cost:
2nHc(α)
1 + qα
(
c′(α)
c(α)
− q
1 + qα
)
= ∂αG(α, nH , n− nH ;T ).
The investors’ participation constraint is derived from (6):
2c(α)
1 + qα
nH + nL−X = µ(α, nH , n− nH)−G(α, nH , n− nH ;T ).
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The essential difference between deposits and securitization is that the bank cannot
commit in advance to a fixed number of nH and nNS. This creates an additional moral
hazard problem to take care of, namely, that the bank may try to cut costs by increas-
ing the proportion of non-screened borrowers. However, it is straightforward to verify
that the expected revenue function G(α, nH , nNS ;T ) is convex in (nH , nNS), and since
C(α, nH , nNS) is linear in the same variables, it follows that the bank will always choose a
corner solution: either (nH , nNS) = (n, 0) or (nH , nNS) = (0, n). When the bank chooses
the first option, the above equations collapse to precisely (7)-(8), and when it chooses the
latter, the expected revenue µ is negative, so the investors’ participation constraint can
never be satisfied.
Consider a solution to (7)-(8) for a fixed nH = n, and denote it by αs(n) and Ts(n).
We know that this is an equilibrium of the subgame where the bank is forced to make out
exactly n loans and securitize them. The bank could also use deposits to reach the exact
same equilibrium if and only if the revenue from choosing αs(n), and (nH , nNS) = (n, 0)
is greater than the revenue from choosing α = 0 and (nH , nNS) = (0, n) (keeping Ts(n)
fixed). Thus, the condition that allows this to be an equilibrium of the deposit subgame is
G(αs(n), n, 0;Ts(n)) ≥ G(0, 0, n;Ts(n)) + 2nc(αs(n))
1 + qαs(n)
. (10)
The above is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. In the subgame where the bank is constrained to finance through deposits,
the bank chooses nNS = 0, and α, nH and T are given by the solution to the Lagrangian
system (9) together with the inequality constraint (10).
4.3 The Equilibrium
To illustrate our method of finding the equilibrium, it is useful to fix n and think about the
bank’s optimal choice of α when financing through securitization. In Figure 1 the lower
panel shows αs(n) (the solid line). The function αs(n) is decreasing for an obvious reason:
the higher the n (and consequentially the leverage), the higher the share of the eventual
revenue that the bank must pay to investors, so its incentive to screen borrowers accurately
diminishes. Next, the upper panel in 1 shows the bank’s profits plotted against n (again,
the solid line). Increasing n linearly increases the surplus at fixed α, but since α decreases
with n, the profits initially grow until some optimal n = n∗s after which the decreasing α
dominates. We denote the level of accuracy at the optimal leverage as α∗s = αs(n
∗
s).
We now turn our attention to deposits. The dashed red line in Figure 1 represents
the profits that the bank would make if after finalizing the securitization contract it would
decide to lend to n unscreened borrowers instead of choosing (nH , nNS) = (n, 0). This
is given by the right-hand-side of (10). (When securitizing the bank does not have this
option, and so the dashed line is irrelevant, but when using deposits the bank does have this
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Figure 1: In the upper panel, the solid line is the bank’s profits for fixed volume of loans
n, and the dashed red line is the bank’s potential potential profit from shirking and not
screening potential borrowers at all. The optimal value of n is the point where the solid
line is maximized (n∗s), and the maximum value of n that can be obtained using deposits
is where the two lines meet (n∗d). The lower panel shows the equilibrium level of accuracy
of screening α for fixed n. The optimal level of screening when securitizing is lower than
when restricted to using deposits.
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option, which puts an upper bound on the level of n.) In Figure 1 the dashed line crosses
the solid line at the point n = n∗d, which is to the left of n
∗
s, implying that this upper bound
is binding. A bank choosing to use deposits will thus choose n = n∗d, and make lower profits
than when securitizing. However, it also would choose α = α∗d = αs(n
∗
d) > α
∗
s, meaning
that if limited to using deposits, the bank would have chosen a higher quality signal.
Imagine that the bank is initially only allowed to use deposits, and then at some point
this limitation is lifted: what would be the result? In the case illustrated in Figure 1,
after the limitation is lifted the bank would increase the volume of lending from n∗d to n
∗
s,
and simultaneously decrease the effort of screening from α∗d to α
∗
s. However, notice that
the lower accuracy of screening is entirely due to the higher n: if the bank was allowed to
securitize but its leverage ratio was restricted by the regulator, there would be no difference
between securitization and deposits.
Finally, there is one other case that can arise, as is illustrated in Figure 2. In this case
the dashed red line is to the right of n∗s. Since the inequality constraint (10) is not binding
at n = n∗s, the bank can reach that volume of lending whether it is securitizing or using
deposits. Therefore, the bank can use either method, and its choice of (n, α) would be the
same. This analysis is summarized by the following two propositions:
Proposition 3. Securitization weakly dominates deposits, and the equilibrium of the full
game is the equilibrium of the securitization subgame as described in Proposition 1. If the
values defined by the securitization equilibrium (α∗s , n
∗
Hs, T
∗
s ) satisfy the inequality
G(α∗s , n
∗
Hs, 0;T
∗
s ) < G(0, 0, n
∗
Hs;T
∗
s ) +
2n∗Hsc(α
∗
s)
1 + qα∗s
, (11)
then securitization strictly dominates deposits.
Proposition 4. Comparing securitization to a situation where the bank is limited to us-
ing deposits, with securitization the bank makes out a larger number of loans and screens
borrowers less accurately:
n∗Hd ≤ n∗Hs, α∗d ≥ α∗s.
If the inequality (11) holds, then the above relationships are strict.
Proposition 4 also implies that leverage and default rates are higher with securitization.
5 Sudden Stops
In this section we modify the model by assuming that investors demand a higher interest on
securities than on deposit. This can be naturally interpreted as deposits providing some
liquidity or other services that produce a convenience yield. We continue to normalize
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Figure 2: As in figure 1, the solid line is the bank’s profits for fixed volume of loans n, and
the dashed line is the potential profits from shirking and not screening borrowers. Here
the dotted line is below the solid line.
the interest on deposits to zero and define the convenience yield to be ρ > 0, thus, the
participation constraint for security buyers is now
2c(α)
1 + qα
nH + nHL−X ≤ µ(α, nH , 0) −G(α, nH , 0;T )
1 + ρ
. (12)
There is no other change to the model: the lagrangian for the deposits subgame remains
unchanged, and the securitization lagrangian is modified to:
LS(ρ) = G− λ
[
µ−G
1− ρ −
2c(α)
1 + qα
nH − nHL+X
]
+
+ τ
[
∂αG− 2nHc(α)
1 + qα
(
c′(α)
c(α)
− q
1 + qα
)]
.
The convenience yield has the simple effect of making securitization more costly to the bank
at any choice of leverage and effort, and thus breaks the tie in favor of deposits whenever
the no-screening constraint (10) does not bind.
The equilibrium is determined as follows: If the no-screening constraint (10) is not
binding at the maximum of the deposits subgame, the it is the global maximum and the
bank chooses to finance using deposits; otherwise, one must compare the local maximum of
the securitization subgame to the point where the no-screening constraint becomes binding
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Figure 3: The profit function of the bank as a function of leverage is plotted when the
convenience yield ρ > 0 and for a few values of q. The arrow shows the direction at which
q is increasing. For each value of q, the maximum of the deposits (securitization) subgame
is denoted by a green (red) circle, and the global maximum is denoted by a square.
for the deposits subgame. The latter case is illustrated in figure 3. The choice between
securitization and deposits is a tradeoff between paying lower yields and taking advantage
of the improved technology of the securitization contract.
Let us focus on how the choice between securitization and deposits depends on the
unconditional quality of potential borrowers, q. This exogenous parameter can either
represent the overall state of the economy, or the credit-worthiness of a particular sub-
market (like a FICO credit score). Figure 3 illustrates the profit function for a few values of
q. One can see that there is a critical value qc below which the deposit-subgame dominates,
and above which the securitization subgame dominates.
As the economy crosses the threshold, the bank switches from deposits to securitization,
and as a result, at the threshold there is a discontinuous drop in the effort level α, and an
increase in the leverage n/X and in the rate of mortgages that default. This is illustrated
in figure 4. This result relates directly to the empirical literature: as shown in Keys et al.
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Figure 4: The behaviour of the screening effort α, the leverage n/X and the rate of
mortgages that default as a function of the exogenous parameter q.
(2009), the observed rate of default is generally decreasing as a function of the FICO score,
however, there is a threshold (FICO=620) below which no securitization occurs, and the
rate of default discontinuously increases across the threshold.
The model, therefore, explains two phenomena: first, why despite credit-worthiness
being a continuous variable, there exists a sharp boundary under which no securitization
occurs (as opposed to securities being offered at a lower price for low-credit-score popu-
lation); and second, how it may happen that a decrease in overall economic conditions
naturally leads to no new securitization activity.
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6 Conclusions
Researchers who have analyzed loan data have found that securitization is associated with
higher default rates (Keys et al., 2009, 2010; Elul, 2016). That same phenomenon happens
in this model, but the mechanism is different than the one suggested. Securitization allows
the bank to commit to lending only to individuals with a high enough credit rating (S =
SH in the model), which alleviates agency problems between the bank and its investors.
However, the improved contracting environment makes it possible for the bank to increase
leverage, and it is the increased leverage that eventually leads to lower effort in obtaining
information about potential borrowers.
Keys et al. (2010) also find that a loan that was securitized is more likely to end in
default even controlling for credit rating. Past literature has suggested that banks have
additional private information about borrowers, and that they select to securitize the lower
quality loans while holding the others. In our model this happens for a different reason:
when securitizing, the banks simply put less effort into screening, and so the same signal
about a lender is less informative. As such, this paper reproduces the observed facts about
securitization and lending standards in a way that is consistent with banks and investors
being rational profit-maximizing agents, and with security and deposit contracts having
the structure that is most common in the real world. It also suggests a testable hypothesis:
that default rates or other measures of loan quality should depend on the method of finance
only through the leverage ratio.
Regarding policy implications, this work demonstrates that securitization is welfare-
enhancing. If the rate of default is of concern to the government, it would be best to limit
leverage rather than to curtail the sale of securities. We also show that the bailouts have
an ex-ante positive effect on welfare, as long as the states of the world where bailouts are
required occurs with low enough probability. The analysis in section B. can be used to
calculate the optimal bailout policy.
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A. On the Optimal Contract
In Subsection 3.4.3 we have postulated that when banks securitize, they form an SPV with
two tranches, selling the entire safer tranche and keeping the equity tranche. Additionally,
we defined deposits as simple debt contracts. The main motivation for making these as-
sumptions is that they correspond to the contracts most frequently observed empirically,
however, we have not made the claim that these are the optimal contracts. In this ap-
pendix we describe the optimal contract, and demonstrate that for reasonable values of the
parameters, the contract structure assumed in the model is a good approximation of the
optimal contract.
Let us consider what would happen if instead of limiting the contracts between the
bank and investors to have the form defined in (2), we allowed it to be completely general.
The analysis would still lead us to the Lagrangian in (9),
L = µ(α, nH , 0)− C(α, nH , 0)+
+ λ
[
µ(α, nH , 0) −G(α, nH , 0;T ) − 2c(α)
1 + qα
nH − nHL+X
]
+
+ τ
[
∂αG(α, nH , 0;T )− 2nHc(α)
1 + qα
(
c′(α)
c(α)
− q
1 + qα
)]
,
only that the function G defined in (5), would now take the more general form:
G(α, nH , nNS ;T ) = E[Y − δ(Y )] =
∫
(Y − δ(Y ))dΦ
(
Y − µ
σ
)
.
Recall that δ(Y ) denotes the payoff to investors as a function of the eventual revenue and
must satisfy 0 ≤ δ(Y ) ≤ Y . An important feature of the Lagrangian is that it is linear in
δ, therefore for any Y , δ(Y ) must be at one of the boundaries: δ(Y ) = 0 or δ(Y ) = Y . We
calculate
∂L
∂δ(Y )
= −(λ− τ∂α) ∂G
∂δ(Y )
= (λ− τ∂α)φ
(
Y − µ
σ
)
=
[
τ(−∂ασ)√
2piσ4
Y 2 + h1(nH , α, τ, λ)Y + h0(nH , α, τ, λ)
]
φ
(
Y − µ
σ
)
,
where hi(nH , α, τ, λ) are independent of Y . The sign of the above expression is determined
by the sign of the term in brackets, which is a quadratic polynomial in Y . The leading
coefficient is positive since ∂ασ < 0 (see equation (4)) and τ > 0.
7 From this we can
7The variable τ is the Lagrange multiplier on the incentive-compatibility constraint of the bank’s eventual
choice of α. The bank would benefit from being able to commit to a higher α, which would make the
constraint that τ multiplies negative. Thus, thinking of τ as a shadow price, it is clear that it must be
positive.
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Figure 5: The distribution density function of revenue is illustrated for two values of α.
The higher value of α is the solid green line. The higher α produces higher probabilities
of the outcomes between T1 and T2.
conclude that the optimal contract can be defined in terms of two parameters (T1, T2) as
follows:
δ(Y ) =
{
0 Y ∈ [T1, T2],
Y otherwise.
To gain intuition about this conclusion, recall that both the bank and the investors are
risk-neutral in our model. Thus, the only criterion to compare contracts is the degree to
which they allow the bank to commit to a higher α. Increasing α has two effects: it increases
the expected outcome µ and decreases the variance σ2. In Figure 5 the distribution density
function is plotted for two values of α. Since increasing α increases the probability of the
outcomes between the points denoted by Y1 and Y2 on the graph, the best way for the bank
to commit to the higher level of α is by agreeing that the bank collects all the revenue if
Y ∈ [Y1, Y2] and the investors collect all the revenue otherwise. However, the contract also
needs to satisfy the investors participation constrain, and the expected revenue restricted
to Y 6∈ [Y1, Y2] is typically not sufficient. Thus, the set [T1, T2] that defines the actual
contract must be wider than the values that appear in the graph (i.e. T1 < Y1 < Y2 < T2).
The form of the optimal contract is rather extreme: investors get nothing in the most
likely states of the world. Such contracts are not observed in reality and also cannot be
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achieved through the technology of securitization. In reality, contracts always specify a
payoff to investors that is nondecreasing in the revenue, and the technology of tranching
additionally requires that δ′(Y ) ≤ 1. There is no motivation for this restriction in our
model, but it is well known how to explain this empirical phenomenon, e.g. by adding
costly state verification to the model (Townsend, 1979). Since this is not the focus of this
paper, we do not wish to complicate the model by adding an assumption of costly state
verification, so we simply impose the additional requirement that 0 ≤ δ′(X) ≤ 1.8
With the additional constraints on the derivative, the problem of finding the optimal
contract remains a linear planning problem, so the solutions is still obtained at the bound-
ary. The optimal contract can always be written as:
δ(Y ) =


Y Y ≤ T1
T1 T1 ≤ Y ≤ T2
T1 + Y − T2 Y > T2
. (13)
The above describes the structure of an SPV with three tranches, where the bank sells
the entire upper and lower tranche and keeps the mezzanine tranche. This same optimal
structure was found in Fender and Mitchell (2009), and for similar reasons: with this
structure the bank does not get paid in extreme events (either good or bad), and that
helps the bank commit the higher levels of vigilance.
In the body of this paper we have assumed that the bank does not use the optimal
structure of the SPV described above, but rather a simpler two-tranche structure where
the bank only sells the lower tranche. This was done both to simplify the calculations, and
since it is the structure which is most frequently observed in reality. However, it should
be emphasized that the entire analysis can be preformed using the optimal three-tranched
structure without affecting the results qualitatively. The reason is that the parameter T2
defined in (13) is typically so large that the probability of the event Y > T2 is very small.
As explained above, T2 must be greater than Y2, which is depicted in Figure 5, and defined
as the larger of the two roots of the equation
∂
∂α
φ
(
Y2 − µ
σ
)
= 0 ⇒ Y2 = (1 + q)(1 + α)
2(q + α)
WnH + o(nH).
Therefore,
Y2 − µ
σ
≈
√
(1− q2)(1− α2)
q + α
n
(1−ζ)/2
H ,
and since the number of loans, nH , is typically very large, Y2 will be many standard
deviations larger than the mean. In other words, while the optimal contract requires
8More accurately, we require that δ(Y ) is differentiable everywhere except for finitely many kink points,
and that limY− δ
′(Y ), limY + δ
′(Y ) ∈ [0, 1].
23
that investors get the entire revenue in some very good states of the world, the cutoff is
practically so high that one can safely ignore this. This both justifies our approximation
and explains why the structure (13) is not frequently observed in the real world.
B. Bailouts
Before the financial crisis of 2008, asset-backed securities were often used as collateral
to back various other financial transactions (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). As a result, in
an event when securities lose value, the government might feel forced to intervene and
guarantee their value. We consider the implications of such policy, by assuming that if
the securities do not pay their face value T , there is a probability b ∈ (0, 1) that the
government will pay investors T instead of the bank. Notice that the bank is not getting
anything directly from the government so its incentive compatibility constraint (7) remains
unaltered. The bailout promise does change the investors’ expected share of the revenue
to ∫ T
−∞
[bT + (1− b)Y ]dF (Y ) +
∫ +∞
T
TdF (Y ) =
= bT
[∫ T
−∞
dF (Y ) +
∫ +∞
T
dF (Y )
]
+ (1− b)
[∫ T
−∞
Y dF (Y ) +
∫ +∞
T
TdF (Y )
]
=
= bT + (1 − b)[µ(α, nH , 0) − G(α, nH , 0;T ).
Therefore, the investors’ participation constraint (8) is modified to
2c(α)
1 + qα
nH + nHL−X = (1− b)[µ(α, nH , 0)−G(α, nH , 0;T )] + bT. (14)
The securitization problem in the presence of bailouts is thus a solution to the Lagrangian
problem
L = µ(α, nH , 0)− 1
1− bC(α, nH , 0) +
b
1− bT−
− λ
[
bT + (1− b)[µ(α, nH , 0)−G(α, nH , 0;T )]− 2c(α)
1 + qα
nH − nHL+X
]
+
+ τ
[
∂αG(α, nH , 0;T ) − 2nHc(α)
1 + qα
(
c′(α)
c(α)
− q
1 + qα
)]
. (15)
The expected cost of the bailout program to the government is
−GS = b
∫ T
−∞
(T − Y )dF (Y ) = b
∫ +∞
−∞
(T − Y )dF (Y ) + b
∫ +∞
T
(Y − T )dF (Y ) =
= b[T − µ(α, nH , 0) + G(α, nH , 0;T )].
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Calculating the effects of a bailout promise is a straightforward exercise in monotone
comparative statics. One simply starts with the Lagrangian (15), and calculates how the
various quantities change as b increases. Since this calculation is rather cumbersome, we
simply report the results and follow with some intuition.
1. If the government forced the bank to keep n fixed, the introduction of a bailout
promise would lead to a higher choice of α.
2. Without leverage restrictions, a bailout promise leads to a higher equilibrium choice
of n. The overall effect on the choice of α is ambiguous.
3. If an increase in b increases α, then increasing b is locally welfare-improving. Oth-
erwise, welfare is concave in b, and there exists an optimal b = b∗ where welfare is
maximized.
The anticipation of a bailout relaxes the investors’ participation constraint. Since
investors get bailed out in some bad events, the bank can offer them a lower share of the
revenue. Since the bank’s share of the revenue is therefore larger, the bank finds it optimal
to be more vigilant about screening borrowers, i.e. to choose a higher α, which explains
the first result above. However, relaxing the bank’s constraints also allows the bank to
choose a higher n, which in turn leads to lower α. The overall effect on α depends on the
parameter values.
When the overall effect on α is negative, a promise of a bailout is welfare-enhancing for
small enough values of b. Initially, the increase in lending activity more than compensates
for the lower α; however, as b is increased, the bank’s choice of n also increases and as a
result α decreases, until after some critical value b∗ the effect of lower accuracy in screening
dominates.
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